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Case No. 60174 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a declaratory judgment action filed by plaintiff insured, 
after defendant denied coverage involving an accident of April 7, 1973. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Trial Court, Honorable John F. Wahlquist, tried the case with-
out a j u ry . Judgment was entered in favor of insured. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the Trial Court judgment. Resondent 
seeks affirmance of the judgment, and allowance of attorneys fees. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts, although involved, are largely not in dispute. Respondent 
("Matlock") had for many years carried automobile insurance with Appellant 
("GEICO"). In 1964, he and another man, one Garner McKnight, purchased a fruit 
orchard of 126 acres near Delta, Colorado (R-83) . This was known as M & M 
Orchards , and operated as a complete separate entity from Matlock's occupation, 
that of anaesthestiologist in Ogden (R-87,84,82). 
All motor vehicles kept at the Colorado orchard were and had always 
been insured with GEICO (R-84, 86) . Matlock had personal cars in Utah and in 
Idaho (when he lived there) insured with another company (R-121). Both policies 
contained what is known as the automatic coverage provision for additional or 
replacement vehicles. 
North Ogden Canning Company was closed in 1972. MatlockTs father-in-law 
had a small interest in the business and he told Matlock of the availability for 
purchase of a 1951 Chevrolet truck owned by the Company (R-86) . Matlock 
checked with the orchard manager, determined they could use such a t ruck, then 
went to the company property to look at it (R-86) . He did not drive it then (or 
ever) but did look at it and agreed to buy it on or about January 5, 1973 (R-88) . 
The truck had not been used or registered for two (2) yea r s , and was in a shed 
on the company property (R-130, 87) . Matlock paid North Ogden Canning Company 
$750.00 for the t ruck, with a check drawn upon M & M O r c h a r d s account (Ex 6) . 
The shed was enclosed within a locked fence on the company property (R-91) . 
Matlock did not have the key to the fence padlock, and did not get the truck keys 
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until April 6, 1973 (R-88). In the interim period, he did receive title to the 
vehicle and shortly before April 6 forwarded it to his foreman in Colorado for 
registering (R-88). 
On April 6, 1973, Horton, the foreman of M & M Orchards, arrived by 
air , was met at Salt Lake by Matlock and driven to the Canning Company. Randall, 
who had sold the truck met them there , opened the fence and gave them the truck 
keys (R-91). Horton started the t ruck, did some minor repa i r s , put on the Colorado 
license plates, and took it to MatlockTs home in Ogden (R-92) . The next day, April 7, 
Horton left for the orchard in the truck about noon. Matlock mailed notice to GEICO 
of acquisition of the truck about 6 p .m. on the 7th (R-93) and Horton was seriously 
injured in a one (1) vehicle accident in Colorado shortly before midnight of the 
7th (R-93) . 
Matlock within two or three days notified GEICO of the accident and 
GEICO through the use of claims agents investigated it over a period of some thirteen 
months. GEICO on June 8, 1973 issued an endorsement covering the 1951 Chevrolet 
truck (Ex. B) effective April 8, 1973. After correspondence from Matlock, GEICO 
issued another endorsement September 12, 1973, covering the same t ruck, effective 
May 23, 1973 (Ex. B) . After further correspondence, and more than six (6) months 
after it was notified of the accident GEICO issued a CORRECTED policy, dated 
October 29, 1973, effective March 30, 1973 through March 30, 1974, covering both 
the 1971 Ford and the 1951 Chevrolet truck that was in the accident of April 7, 1973 
(Ex. B ) . 
On January 22, 1974, GEICO sent Matlock a reservation of rights letter 
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(Ex. 2) . On May 6, 1974, GEICO denied coverage to Matlock for the accident 
of April 7, 1973 (Ex. AA) . Suit was filed by Matlock to determine 
coverage July 30, 1973 (R-l) . Suit was filed in Federal Court in Colorado by 
Horton against Matlock claiming damage for his injuries from the accident in 
September of 1974. Defense of the suit was tendered by Matlock to GEICO 
September 5, 1974, and refused (R-116). By memorandum decision after 
briefing and argument, Judge Wahlquist found the issues in favor of Matlock and 
against GEICO (R-43). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED RESPONDENT 
GAVE APPELLANT NOTICE WITHIN THE THIRTY DAY 
AUTOMATIC INSURANCE PERIOD OF THE POLICY. 
An "automatic" insurance provision, such as we have here , is a 
common one. The beneficial purpose of such provisions is to eliminate the problem 
of gaps in insurance coverage on automobiles operating on the highways. 7 Am Jur 
2d, Automobile Insurance §100; Western Casualty Company v Lund, 10th C .C .A. , 
1956, 234 F2d 916. The legal effect is to provide insurance coverage for a period 
of thirty (30) days after acquisition without regard to actual notice. If the required 
notice is not given within thirty (30) days by the insured, coverage terminates 
on the newly acquired car . Western Casualty v Lund, supra , English v Dairy land 
Mutual Insurance Company, 1968, 21 U2d 221, 443 P2d 661. This particular pro-
vision is for the benefit of the insured, English, supra , and GEICO included 
in its premium charge a sum attributable to the cost of such benefit (R-60, 43). 
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The policy provision at issue is 
" . . . and the named insured notifies the company within 
thirty (30) days after the date of such acquisition" . . . 
(Ex. A ) . 
No other policy language seems helpful. However, the policy change request 
form issued by GEICO to policy holders (Ex. C) is very helpful. This form 
specifies the policyholder is protected if GEICO is notified within thirty (30) days 
of DELIVERY of the newly acquired automobile. At best , the policy is uncertain 
as to when the thirty days begins; in the event of uncertainty the language should 
be construed most strongly against the company that prepared it and issued it, 
Auto Lease Company v Central Mutual Insurance Co . , 1958, 7 U2d 336,325 P2d 264. 
Here Matlock paid for the truck in January , but took no possession or 
control of i t . He registered it and transferred title April 6, 1973 (Ex. BB) and 
took delivery April 7. The truck could not be operated on the highways in the 
interim because it was not registered and had not been for two (2) yea r s . Matlock 
had no control during this period as the truck was under lock and key on the 
Canning Company property. Matlock had no possession, not even constructive, 
until April 7. 
Section 41-1-72, U.C.A. 1953, provides: 
"41-1-72. Necessary before transfer complete.—Until the 
department shall have issued such new certificate of registra-
tion and certificate of ownership, delivery of any vehicle r e -
quired to be registered shall be deemed not to have been 
made and title thereto shall be deemed not to have passed, and 
said intended transfer shall be deemed to be incomplete and 
not to be valid or effective fo£ any purpose except as provided 
in section 41-1-77." (Emphasis added) . 
41-1-77, U.C.A. 1953 is not applicable hece. 
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Does the word Acquisition1 denote title, possession, or both? Utah 
has not decided th is , other courts have with varying resul ts . Glen Falls Insurance 
Co. v Gray, 1967, 5th C C A . , 386 F2d 520, reasons that since the principal pur-
pose of liability insurance is to provide coverage for an automobile which is to be 
driven and may become involved in an accident, the vehicle is not acquired until 
it is operable. The 1951 Chevrolet here was not operable (no valid license or 
registration) until April 6, 1973. 
The normal purchaser of a car wants coverage on it from delivery -
that is when he acquires the car in the practical sense. Mathews v Market Casualty 
Co . , 1963 La. , 152 S2d 577, interpreted language identical to our case to refer to 
delivery. This interpretation is certainly adopted by GEICOTs own interpretation 
referred to in Exhibit C (thirty days of delivery) . Matlock's interpretation 
of this concurred with GEICO - he wanted liability insurance (not fire or other 
coverage) on the vehicle when he took delivery, put it in operable condition and 
put it on the road. 
An Annotation at 34 ALR 2d 936 has some collected cases that are of 
interest . Section 5 of that annotation at page 941 reviews cases turning 
on ownership as the requisi te, Section 6 following discusses delivery 
as the key i ssue . Delivery, of course, is used in its ordinary and 
usual sense, the handing over of a physical possession and control to the new 
owner. Plasman v Fremont Insurance Co. , 113 NW2d 906. Clearly, delivery was 
never accomplished here until April 6, 1973. 
Cases relied upon by appellant are not pursuasive here . Commercial 
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Standard Insurance Co. v Universal Underwriters, 10th C C A . , 1960, 282 F2d 24 
was a contest between carr iers to see whose coverage was primary. The court held 
the vehicle was newly acquired, but no issue as to time was involved, and the new 
owner was in the car when it was being operated on a ride for mutual pleasure. 
Wisbey v Nationwide Mutual Insurance, 1973, 507 P2d 17, Oregon, 
bases its finding on the fact that the insured wanted protection not only for liability, 
but also for fire and theft. 
Williams v Standard Accident Insurance Company, California 1958, 
332 P2d 1026, is completely distinguishable in that title was transferred and the car 
was delivered to the buyer in January of 1952. The accident was in May. The only 
question was whether the Trial Court was required to believe the i n s u r e d s testimony 
that the car was inoperable all of that time up to two (2) days before the accident, and 
the Appellate Court held no. 
U .S .F . & C_v MiNault, 72 A2d 161, 1950 NH, is a reverse situation, 
to see whether the insurance of the seller was still in force. Since no sale had occurred, 
merely an agreement to sell , the insurance was still in effect. 
One Utah case that may be helpful is Stewart v Combined Insurance 
Company, 114 U 278, 198 P2d 467. In that case after the death of the owner, one 
of the heirs gave possession of the car , title and registration documents, and keys 
to the new purchaser . The heir received money at the same time, but not the full 
pr ice . The new purchaser while driving had an accident, and this court held the 
decedent fs insurance was still in effect on the vehicle, as no valid sale had taken 
place. 
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Yahnke v State Farm Fire & Casualty, Arizona 1966, 419 P2d 548, in-
volved the interesting question of a jeep in need of repairs being delivered and 
taken into possession a year before the accident, but title not passing until some 
few days before the accident. The Arizona Court held the vehicle was ?newly 
acquired1 under the policy, and that both title and possession must occur before 
the car is newly acquired. 
In view of all the evidence, we submit the Trial Court was correct in 
ruling that Matlock did not Tacquire1 the vehicle under policy terms until he took 
operative control, delivery, transferred title, licensed the t ruck, got the keys , and 
removed it from the fenced enclosure on April 6, 1973, the day before the accident. 
The notice of April 7, 1973 was within the thirty (30) day period provided, and 
GEICO is obligated by its contract to appear and defend for its insured in the 
Colorado Federal Court suit. 
POINT TWO 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THE 1951 
CHEVROLET WAS A FARM VEHICLE UNDER POLICY 
TERMS. 
The policy provision here material is the definition of "Farm Auto-
mobile": 
"means an automobile of the truck type with a load capacity of 
fifteen hundred (1500) pounds or less not used for business or 
commercial purposes other than farming." 
Appellant cites a case, Buswell v Biles, La 1968, 205 S2d 165, to show this refers to 
the manufacturers rating rather than actual load capacity. Buswell in fact decided 
on an entirely different question - whether the insurer insured all of the policy -
- 8 -
holders vehicles. The quote on page 19 of Appellants Brief is out of context and 
should read as follows: 
"We find from our study of the record that this was the 
clear intent of both the insurer and the insured and that 
the load capacity . . . " (underlining added to show the 
difference from the original quote). 
The Tclear intentT this refers to is the question of all vehicles, not weight rat ings. 
In talking about weight ra t ings , the Louisiana Court simply held the fact that a three-
quarter ton pickup could hold more than 1500 pounds would not vitiate coverage, the 
identical result reached by Judge Wahlquist (R-45) . 
"To permit them to have a policy defense when they clearly 
take premiums or bill for trucks larger than that as ordinary 
farm vehicles is unconcionable." 
The policy could easily state Manufacturers rated capacity1. It does 
not, but uses Tload capacity'. The only evidence on load capacity before the trial 
court came from the policyholder, Matlock. He testified that a half-ton truck was 
rated capacity of 1545 pounds, and carries regularly 3500 to 4000 pounds (R-138,9) . 
The three-quarter ton pickup would be rated higher than 1500 pounds, and could 
carry even more than the half-ton. In other words the 1971 Ford pickup appearing 
on the same policy we have (Ex. B) has a capacity far greater than 1500 pounds, 
yet it was always insured under the same policy and coverage with GEICO. The 
same was true (R-138) of the 1963 one and one-half ton truck insured at the farm in 
1964 by GEICO, and of all the farm vehicles used over the years on M & M Orchards. 
It was also true of 1972 and a 1973 pickup trucks insured by GEICO (R-140) . No 
denial from GEICO on any of these vehicles was ever received until this incident 
arose (R-141). 
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We should note also the importance put on this by GEICO. See the 
application form (Ex. C) for additional vehicle coverage. Page three (3) is a full 
page questionaire as to the additional vehicle, but nowhere does it ever ask about 
weight ratings or carrying capacity. 
Clearly, this provision being for the benefit of the insured, it should 
be construed in his favor. If it is to mean manufacturers rated capacity, it should 
so state. Since a half-ton truck is rated at 1545 pounds, it obviously doesnTt refer 
to designation as half-ton, etc. Regardless of th is , GEICO has been insuring M & M 
vehicles for years , with carrying capacity well in excess of 1500 pounds, and never 
raised any fuss about it . We submit the Trial Court correctly interpreted this as 
an approximate guide only, and one that had not been adhered to in the past between 
the parties to the insurance contracts. 
POINT THREE 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND RESPONDENT 
ENTITLED TO THE BENEFITS OF THE THIRTY DAY 
AUTOMATIC INSURANCE PROVISION OF THE POLICY. 
M & M Orchards was purchased in 1964 by a partnership of Matlock 
and one Garner McKnight (R-83) . Between 1964 and 1973, Matlock had become sole 
owner of the property. From its inception, it was operated as a complete separate 
entity. It had separate books, checking accounts, tax re turns (R-84) . Matlock 
is a physician and anaethesiologist in Ogden and did not operate the orchard (R-92). 
The funds to purchase the truck were drawn on the M & M Orchard 
account, on the Colorado Bank and Trust Company at Delta, Colorado. (Ex. 6) . 
The premiums paid to GEICO on the policy in question were M & M Orchard funds 
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drawn on the same account (Ex. CC) . Premium notices were sent to M & M Orchards 
at Delta (Ex. H) . The named insured as set out in the policy (Ex. B) is 
MELVIN L. MATLOCK 
M & M ORCHARDS 
POST OFFICE BOX 6 
DELTA, COLORADO 81416 
It is at once apparent that M & M Orchards, Delta, Colorado, is a bus i -
ness entity separate and apart from Melvin Matlock, M.D. , Ogden, Utah. All 
vehicles owned and used by M & M Orchards were insured with GEICO, and had 
been for the last ten (10) yea r s . The one fact that Matlock, as an individual, is 
liable for debts of M & M Orchards, does not mean M & M Orchards is not the named 
insured. 
Boling v State Farm Mutual, Mo. 1971, 466 SW2d 696 involved a policy 
issued to Paul Hurst, d /b /a Hurst Materials Company. In fact the car was owned 
by Hurst Materials Inc . , was paid for by the corporation, and the insurance premiums 
were paid by the corporation. State Farm refused to pay the claim on the basis that 
Hurst, the individual, was the named insured, rather than the corporation he 
controlled. The Missouri Court held the corporation was in fact the named insured, 
not Hurst, and said: 
"The checks for the policy premiums were issued by Hunt 
Materials, Inc . , payable to State Farm, which fact causes 
it to be estopped to deny that the corporation was the insured." 
Roseu v National Union Fire Insurance Company, Fla. 1971, 249 S2d 
701 had a similar question - the named insured was Tokaiski and Martin, d /b /a 
Market Truck Stop. A car owned individually by Tokaiski was in an accident, and 
the court held the car was not owned by the Tnamed insured1 . 
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GEICO here is arguing the reverse - that M & M Orchards is not the 
named insured, but Melvin Matlock i s . The Trial Court correctly found from 
the evidence that the 1951 Chevrolet truck was entitled to the automatic coverage 
protection of the policy. 
POINT FOUR 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND APPELLANT 
WAIVED, AND WAS ESTOPPED FROM ASSERTING 
POLICY DEFENSES. 
We agree with GEICO that waiver and estopped, although related, are 
separate and distinct doctrines. The former involves voluntary relinquishment of 
a r ight , the latter inducing another to act (or fail to act) to his detriment. Both 
elements are present here . 
GEICO presents three (3) policy defenses -
1) acquisition outside of thirty (30) day period; 
2) excess weight vehicle; 
3) vehicles insured with other companies. 
The acquisition defense was first suggested by the reservation of rights 
letter of January 22, 1974. Excess weight was first raised in the answer filed in 
this case July 30, 1974. Other vehicles not insured with GEICO was first suggested 
in the denial letter of May 6, 1974. Let us see when each of these possible defenses 
were known by GEICO: 
1. Acquisition - Exhibit J , letter of Matlock to GEICO of April 28, 
1973 in part: 
"On April 7, 1973 I sent you notice of the used 1951 Chevrolet 
truck acquired by me on that date. The actual date of registration 
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and licensing of this vehicle was April 6, 1973 Vehicle 
Id. No. JEA 1070045. This vehicle had been purchased 
on January 5, 1973 but had not been moved from point 
of purchase until April 7, 1973. The vehicle was wrecked 
in a one (1) vehicle accident about 10: 00 p .m. April 7, 1973. 
I notified you of this accident sometime thereafter." 
2. Excess weight - Exhibit I, letter of Matlock to GEICO of April 7, 1973, 
mailed prior to the accident: 
"Effective today I have purchased and put in service a used one and 
one-half ton truck - 1951 Chevrolet one and one-half ton truck 
Identification No. JEA 1070045, licensed in State of Colorado. Same 
driver as present vehicle - I would like this vehicle insured for 
liability only same coverage as the Ford t ruck ." (Emphasis added) . 
3. Other vehicles insured with Security Mutual - Exhibit 3, letter 
response of Matlock to GEICO of January 6, 1973, stating 1972 truck 
was now insured with 'other company1. Exhibit O, letter of Matlock 
to GEICO of July 9, 1973: 
"When I did not hear from you for over a month, I insured the 
unit (72 Chevrolet) with another company . . . " 
We could set out many additional exhibits confirming this knowledge, 
but we think these three are conclusive on knowledge and date of knowledge. There 
is no allegation or suggestion that at any time Matlock furnished false information, or 
withheld any information from GEICO. 
In light of this information, what actions did GEICO take? 
They insured the 1951 Chevrolet t ruck, charged a premium for it and 
collected it . Exhibit B shows they initially added it by endorsement of June 8, 
effective April 8, then by endorsement of September 12, effective May 23, and finally 
by Corrected Policy Contract, issued October 29, 1973, effective March 30, 1973 
through March 30, 1974. 
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GEICO investigated the accident through their agents McMillan in 
Colorado and Hollcraft in Ogden (R-136,177) . GEICO representatives told Matlock 
'this should wrap it upT (R-113). They requested policy verification from Matlock 
August 8, 1973 (Ex. D); Matlock responded with what was asked for (Ex. E ) . 
On August 8, 1973 the home office wrote Matlock (Ex. R) "We apologize 
for the delay. Coverages are in force . . . " 
In December of 1973 the authorized claim agent, McMillan, advised 
Matlock (Ex. F) "This loss occurred in April when these files were handled out of 
Washington, D .C . In July our area was then taken over by the San Francisco office, 
although existing files were to be reported to Washington, D .C. So we continued to 
report to that office. Without any response from them I then called San Francisco. 
You recall at one time Washington office told me they had issued the draft. Frankly 
I don't know what is going on, but all I can say is that I was told by phone today 
that she would run the file down and make p a y m e n t . . . " 
On September 24, 1973, (Ex. V) GEICO home office wrote Matlock (after 
erroniously cancelling the policy for a claimed non-payment that had never occurred): 
"We are re-instating your policy effective July 11, 1973 without a 
lapse in coverage. Effective October 25, 1972 we are deleting the 
1972 Chevrolet camper/truck. Effective May 10, 1973 we are deleting 
the 1951 Chevrolet pick-up from your policy. We apologize for the 
confusion. Corrected policy papers will follow." 
The corrected policy was issued (Ex. B) showing coverage of the 1951 
Chevrolet at time of the accident. 
All of the above actions were taken with full knowledge of all of the 
policy defenses GEICO now asser t s . This is not a case where the company is unaware 
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of the true facts until discovery during the investigation. 
Matlock testified he made no investigation of the accident, and had no 
one do it for him, relying upon GEICO (R-114) . GEICO did in fact make an investi-
gation, but has never made available the results or contents of that to Matlock (R-114). 
He further testified that but for his reliance upon GEICO, he would have sought 
immediate professional help and seen to it that a prompt investigation was made. 
He also testified an investigation made after the denial of coverage would be far less 
effective than one done immediately after the accident (R-115). 
The huge lawsuit now facing Matlock claims negligence in furnishing a 
defective vehicle (R-118) . Obviously, an investigation made over thirteen (13) months 
after the accident would have little relevance as to the condition of the truck on 
April 7, 1973. An inspection of the vehicle immediately after the accident was essential 
to the defense of this suit, and because he was relying on GEICO, Matlock had none 
made. The Trial Court, in its memorandum decision, recognized th is , stating (R-45): 
"Third, for many months the defendant has led the plaintiff to 
believe that they were defending the suit. The plaintiff is in no 
position to take defense now. The insurance company should be 
estopped at this time to deny coverage. 
The Court recognizes that part of the period was covered by a 
conditional appearance, but even a conditional appearance was 
not effective until long after an opportunity for "safety inspec-
tion" of the t ruck, e t c . , had expired. The confusion as to which 
truck they insured was their own and had no justification in fact." 
The Utah case argued at length in its brief by GEICO, State Farm Mutual 
v Kay, 1971, 26 U2d 195, 487 P2d 852, is not controlling here . In that case plaintiff 
and defendant were son and mother, living in the same house, and both were in the 
car when it overturned. The passage of time did not involve loss of evidence (as here) 
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and because of the family relationship would have no effect on settlement possibilities. 
None of these facts as here exist - Matlock is faced with defense of a suit with serious 
injuries (over $5,000.00 in hospital expenses as of August, 1973, Ex. D) , large 
claim for damage, no efforts at settlement, and no relationship with the plaintiff that 
would induce settlement. Any chance for an effective evaluation of the evidence by 
an independent expert on vehicles is long since past . The delay in Kay was 5 months, 
in Matlock 13. The matter of prejudice is not an allegation, it is based on testimony, 
specifically found by the Court, and not controverted by any other evidence. 
An insurer who provides coverage or begins to investigate an accident 
is not estopped until he has knowledge of the facts behind which the exclusion or 
denial may res t . See 7 Am Jur 2d, Automobile Insurance, Section 171. It is also 
the universal rule that an unreasonable delay in notifying the insured of denial of 
coverage will constitute a waiver or an estoppel against the insurer . Appleman 
Insurance Law, Volume 16A, Section 9361. 
An annotation reported at 3£ ALR 2d beginning at Page 1148 is involved 
with waiver and estoppel and the timeliness required. In Section 8 beginning at Page 
1169 it points out the general rule requires that for a notice of denial to be effective 
on behalf of the insurer , the notice must be timely served. Generally, this question 
of whether the timeliness was reasonable or unreasonable is one of fact for the court 
or ju ry . 
A short period of time is required if the denial is to be effective. In 
U .S . Casualty Company v Home Insurance Company, a New Jersey case found at 
192 Atlantic 2d 169, a delay from June 28th when knowledge was acquired to July 7th 
when denial was made was held not to be unreasonable. 
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A case with similar time sequences to ours , although a different factual 
situation, is Salarno v Western Casualty, an Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals case 
found at 336 Federal 2d, Page 14. In that case an accident involving one of the insured 's 
horses causing injuries occurred on March 23, 1959. It was promptly reported to 
the insurance company and within five days thereafter the insurance company had 
full knowledge or means of finding out the extent of the horse raising operation the 
insured carried on. On June 22, 1959, suit was filed by the injured party and the 
insurance company assumed the defense thereof. On April 6, 1960, based upon 
additional information the insurance company acquired on April 1st, 1960, it filed 
a declaratory judgment seeking to avoid coverage. The Federal Court analyzed this 
from the standpoint of the insurance company's having waived itTs right to make 
such a denial, and found that as a factual matter complete knowledge of all the facts 
which would enable it to disclaim were either known to or within the ability to discover 
of the insurance company within five (5) days of the accident. ItTs inefficiency in going 
forward and ascertaining any additional facts it deemed necessary and in the mean-
time letting the insured rely on it for defense for a period of just over one year was 
sufficient that as a matter of law the insured was prevented from denying the coverage 
in question. 
A case involving a delayed waiver of notice on an automatic insurance 
provision was Missouri Managerial Corporation v Pasquelleno, found at 323 South-
western 2d Page 224. In that case the replacement automobile was acquired May 8, 
1955, and no notice was given before the accident it was involved in on July 10th of 
1955. The company had full knowledge of all the relevent facts By September of 1955, 
some three months following the accident. Suit was filed against the insured on 
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November 2nd of 1955 and the insurance company assumed the defense thereof. 
It did not secure a non-waiver agreement from the insured until February 13th 
of 1956. By this action the Court held that the insured was conclusively presumed 
to have been damaged and refused to allow the insurance company relief from its 
policy provisions. 
The case of Mistele v Ogle, Missouri, 293 Southwestern 
2d, Page 330, also involved a question of waiver. In this case the insurance carrier 
knew or had the ability to obtain the information regarding the question of coverage 
and yet delayed unreasonably for almost two (2) years to withdraw from the case. 
They claimed recent acquisition of the knowledge but the Court found that they had 
the means of knowledge earlier than that. 
Another case is Merchants Industrial Corporation v^  Eggleston, 
179 Atlantic 2d, Page 505. Here the car involved was in an accident May 12th of 
1958. The insurance company acquired the facts concerning ownership of the car 
which gave rise to exclusion under the policy on May 26th of 1958. Despite th is , it 
did not take any action or place the insured on notice it was reserving its r ights 
until it filed a declaratory judgment action on February 25, 1959. This delay 
of some nine (9) months was held too long to enable the insurance carrier to deny. 
In doing so the Court said, 
"In short , if a carr ier receives information suggesting 
fraud or breach of contract, it must seek the facts with 
reasonable diligence and having acquired them, it must 
within a reasonable period decide whether to continue to 
perform. What is a reasonable time depends upon the 
circumstances. In the case of a liability policy an important 
circumstance is that the one who is to pay should have an 
early opportunity to investigate the outstanding claim of the 
third par ty. Here Merchants had notice of the facts in 
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May, 1958. By September 19th it surely knew the story, but 
nevertheless it continued to claim control in the preparation 
for and the defense of the damage suit. We have no doubt that 
its conduct constituted an election to affirm the policy. It 
thus waived in the sense here pertinent its right to disclaim." 
It is clear from the record of the trial that Matlock is in a position where 
the facts of the accident, the condition of the vehicle, and other relevant matters are 
cold. He has rested in the security of his bought and paid for contract of insurance 
for months during which time the insurance carrier so far as we know conducted 
an investigation of the matter. At this late date to be left to assume the defense of 
the Federal Court action without coverage and without the help of the defendant 
company clearly shows that he is in a much worse position. All of the facts here 
relevant were known to the company not later than April 28th, 1973. Most of the 
facts they now claim excluded coverage were known well before that date. We 
respectfully submit that the carr ier has chosen in light of those facts to proceed with 
the matter and should not be allowed by its belated denial some thirteen (13) months 
after the accident to escape from the coverage it sold Matlock. 
POINT FIVE 
RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO HIS ATTORNEYS FEES 
FOR PROSECUTING THIS ACTION. 
The Trial Court found (R-62) that Matlock had actually incurred 
reasonable attorneys fees to his counsel in the sum of $750.00, but refused to award 
Matlock judgment for that sum. Matlock has raised this as error by the statement 
of points he filed May 20, 1975 (R-72). 
The amount of the fees, and reasonableness are not challenged. 
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It is universally recognized that if an insurer wrongfully refuses to 
defend a liability claim, it will be liable for all damages from such breach of contract, 
including any judgment entered against the insured, any settlement rendered, and 
the costs of defense to the insured, including attorneys fees. 49 ALR 2d 695, 
Section 1 2 - 1 6 . 
When Matlock defends the Colorado suit, he is entitled to recover his attorney 
fees in such defense. Is there a valid reason to deny him this same right when he is 
forced to employ counsel to prosecute this declaratory judgement action? 
Three cases that do not recognize such a distinction, and allow the 
insured his attorneys fees in declaratory actions, are Utilities Construction Corp. v 
Peerless Insurance Co. , D.C. Vt. 1963, 223 F . Supp. 64; National Indemnity Co. v 
Harper, D.C. Mo. 1969, 295 F. Supp. 749; and Connecticut Fire Insurance v 
Reliance Insurance, 208 F . Supp. 20, D.C. Kansas 1962. These cases in some 
instances rely upon statutes, and so may not be precise authority for our case. 
However, they do illustrate that no valid reason is evident to deny fees in our 
instance and grant them in another, when the substance of both is the same. 
Matlock should be awarded $750.00 as his attorneys fees in the lower 
court, and a reasonable fee for his attorneys fees on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Matlock respectfully submits the evidence fully supports the Trial Courts 
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